Imperialism
Pandoras Lāde
2011/10/02
Kaut gan 2011. gada 17. septembŗa 11-tās Saeimas ārkārtas vēlēšanās neviena latviešu partija uzvarējusi nav – tas ir, nav guvusi mandātu neatkarīgi veidot valdību, latviešiem ir pavērusies iespēja izveidot nacionālu koāliciju.
[Zatlera Reformu Partija 22; Vienotība 20; Nacionālā Apvienība 14 = 56 pret Zaļo Zemnieku Sabiedrību (‘oligarchiem’) 13; un Saskaņu Centru (bijušo padomju funkcionāru un krievu partiju) 31].
Par pirmajiem vēlēšanu rezultātiem Anna Žigure, rakstniece un bijušā vēstniece Somijā, saka: 11-tās Saeimas galvenais uzvarētājs nav Saskaņu Centrs... un jaunajai Saeimai ir dotas visas iespējas atraisīt sabiedrībā lielu pozitīvu enerģiju...
Vai, tiešām, galvenais ir sasniegts?
ZRP līderis, Eksprezidents Zatlers, ir apsolījis iztīrīt Latviju no oligarchiem – sīkgrupniekiem, kas ar koruptām metodēm, censdamies pēc varas, ir laupījuši valsti. Un latvieši Latvijā un visā pasaulē ir sapratuši, ka Zatlers, ja iegūtu vēlētāju atbalstu, veidotu tīrāku un gaišāku Latviju.
Starp latviešu partijām Zatlers ir ieguvis visminimālāko pārākumu – bet arī simtdaļa sekundes skaitās - un, ar aizrautu elpu, tauta jau otro nedēļu gaida ziņas par nacionālas koālicijas veidošanu un jaunās valdības sastādīšanu.
Bet Zatlers ir pazudis - iestidzis slepenās sesijās ar SC līderi un aizņemts ar kaut kādu darba un expertu grupu organizēšanu un vadīšanu.
Kad stāsies viņš pie tā darba, ko tautai ir apsolījis – veidot tīrāku un gaišāku Latviju?
Nacionāla koālicija nav pat uz sliedēm. Vienotības Dombrovskis jau pirmajā dienā ir TV-Net paskaidrojis, ka viņam būtu pieņemams „ZRP-V-SC koālicijas modelis”.
Bet SC nepieņem viņu. SC runā tikai ar Zatleru; 31:22 dotu SC noteicošo vārdu, un Latvijas valdību pārņemtu krievi.
Bet tā kā Vienotība ir tikai pāris soļus aiz ZRP, ar skaļiem protestiem Dombrovskis ir panācis sarunas ar Zatleru divatā - otrajā darba grupā.
Cik saprotams, Zatlers darbojas divās grupās – kuŗas viena ar otru nerunā. Un cik saprotams, nevienai no šīm slēgtajām sesijām nacionāla koālacija nav uz aģendas.
Deviņas dienas pēc vēlēšanām Vienotības Solvita Āboltiņa teikusi LT-Net, ka atrodot stāvokli „ļoti sarežģītu” – tomēr cerot, ka līdz 17. oktobrim partijas spēšot vienoties par jaunu valdību.
Par kādu valdību var vienoties tādi, kas nesarunājas? Tā tad masku balle turpināsies līdz 17. oktobrim, kamēr miglas aizsegā Zatlers būs iztirgojis jaunajai Saeimai dotās iespējas.
Un Latvija nekad nav bijusi tik klusa. Ir lietas, par kuŗām aizliedz runāt, un Presei uzliek uzpurni.
Ar Nacionālo Apvienību, trešo latviešu ievēlēto partiju, nerunā neviens, tā ignorējot tieši vēlētāju publiku.
Var apmuļkot vienu cilvēku kādreiz, bet nevar apmuļkot visus vienmēr. Notiekošais ir tukšu salmu kulšana, aiz kuŗas var slēpties tikai viltus un nodevība, un Eksprezidenta pēc-vēlēšanu manervi prasās pēc izskaidrojuma.
Liekas viņš nevar izšķirties - veidot nacionālu koāliciju, vai mesties kopā ar SC. Viņa pēc-vēlēšanu nostāja it kā norāda uz abu amigo kaut kādām priekš-vēlēšanu saistībām.
Politiskas saistības saistās ar politiskiem mērķiem. Kādi varētu būtu šo divu mērķi? Un ko tie maksātu Latvijai?
Ka SC saņem bagātīgus atbalstus no apslēptiem avotiem norāda astronomiskās summas, bez kādām partijas plašā vēlēsanu kampaņa nebūtu bijusi iespējama. Partijas, ar ierobežotiem līdzekļiem, neko tik plašu atļauies nevar.
Vai gan tas nesmird pēc oligarchijas?
Un nevar arī nejautāt, kas gan īsti ir orķestrējis pašas vēlēšanas – reformists Zatlers vai SC? Ka SC ir ņēmis aktīvu dalību pie 10-tās Saeimas likvidēšanas, norāda skaitļi – 95% nav iespējamas bez SC pilnīga atbalsta.
Un vai aiz jaunās ZRP dibināšanas arī nav stāvējis Saskaņu Centrs? Jo vairāk latviešu partiju, jo lielāka šķelšanās, un vai SC nevarēja (tikai pa jokam) pamēģināt atbrīvoties no populārās Vienotības? Bet Vienotība, kaut gan zaudējusi vienu trešo no sava svara, stāv tikai pāris soļus aiz ZRP; tāpēc Saskaņu Centram nekas cits neatliek, kā Vienotību izslēgt.
Ar 31:42 SC nevar spēlēt pirmo vijoli.
Liekas gan, no Zatlera un Dombrovska partijām daudz pāri nebūtu palicis, jā vēlētāji būtu pazinuši šos vīrus.
Un par ko gan lai balso, ja tādi kā Zatlers un Dombrovskis noraida nacionālu koāliciju?
Tāpēc, tiem diviem – un viņu atbalstītājiem – ir laiks nomest maskas un ķerties pie Latvijas darba, kam viņi ir apsolījuši veltīt laiku un talantu.
Bet vēl vēlamāka būtu resignēšanās!
Reiz atvērta, Pandoras lāde netaisās ciet, un jautājumi krīt kā krusa.
Labais lasītāj, vai arī Tev būtu kas sakāms?
Hilda Smeķe
[Zatlera Reformu Partija 22; Vienotība 20; Nacionālā Apvienība 14 = 56 pret Zaļo Zemnieku Sabiedrību (‘oligarchiem’) 13; un Saskaņu Centru (bijušo padomju funkcionāru un krievu partiju) 31].
Par pirmajiem vēlēšanu rezultātiem Anna Žigure, rakstniece un bijušā vēstniece Somijā, saka: 11-tās Saeimas galvenais uzvarētājs nav Saskaņu Centrs... un jaunajai Saeimai ir dotas visas iespējas atraisīt sabiedrībā lielu pozitīvu enerģiju...
Vai, tiešām, galvenais ir sasniegts?
ZRP līderis, Eksprezidents Zatlers, ir apsolījis iztīrīt Latviju no oligarchiem – sīkgrupniekiem, kas ar koruptām metodēm, censdamies pēc varas, ir laupījuši valsti. Un latvieši Latvijā un visā pasaulē ir sapratuši, ka Zatlers, ja iegūtu vēlētāju atbalstu, veidotu tīrāku un gaišāku Latviju.
Starp latviešu partijām Zatlers ir ieguvis visminimālāko pārākumu – bet arī simtdaļa sekundes skaitās - un, ar aizrautu elpu, tauta jau otro nedēļu gaida ziņas par nacionālas koālicijas veidošanu un jaunās valdības sastādīšanu.
Bet Zatlers ir pazudis - iestidzis slepenās sesijās ar SC līderi un aizņemts ar kaut kādu darba un expertu grupu organizēšanu un vadīšanu.
Kad stāsies viņš pie tā darba, ko tautai ir apsolījis – veidot tīrāku un gaišāku Latviju?
Nacionāla koālicija nav pat uz sliedēm. Vienotības Dombrovskis jau pirmajā dienā ir TV-Net paskaidrojis, ka viņam būtu pieņemams „ZRP-V-SC koālicijas modelis”.
Bet SC nepieņem viņu. SC runā tikai ar Zatleru; 31:22 dotu SC noteicošo vārdu, un Latvijas valdību pārņemtu krievi.
Bet tā kā Vienotība ir tikai pāris soļus aiz ZRP, ar skaļiem protestiem Dombrovskis ir panācis sarunas ar Zatleru divatā - otrajā darba grupā.
Cik saprotams, Zatlers darbojas divās grupās – kuŗas viena ar otru nerunā. Un cik saprotams, nevienai no šīm slēgtajām sesijām nacionāla koālacija nav uz aģendas.
Deviņas dienas pēc vēlēšanām Vienotības Solvita Āboltiņa teikusi LT-Net, ka atrodot stāvokli „ļoti sarežģītu” – tomēr cerot, ka līdz 17. oktobrim partijas spēšot vienoties par jaunu valdību.
Par kādu valdību var vienoties tādi, kas nesarunājas? Tā tad masku balle turpināsies līdz 17. oktobrim, kamēr miglas aizsegā Zatlers būs iztirgojis jaunajai Saeimai dotās iespējas.
Un Latvija nekad nav bijusi tik klusa. Ir lietas, par kuŗām aizliedz runāt, un Presei uzliek uzpurni.
Ar Nacionālo Apvienību, trešo latviešu ievēlēto partiju, nerunā neviens, tā ignorējot tieši vēlētāju publiku.
Var apmuļkot vienu cilvēku kādreiz, bet nevar apmuļkot visus vienmēr. Notiekošais ir tukšu salmu kulšana, aiz kuŗas var slēpties tikai viltus un nodevība, un Eksprezidenta pēc-vēlēšanu manervi prasās pēc izskaidrojuma.
Liekas viņš nevar izšķirties - veidot nacionālu koāliciju, vai mesties kopā ar SC. Viņa pēc-vēlēšanu nostāja it kā norāda uz abu amigo kaut kādām priekš-vēlēšanu saistībām.
Politiskas saistības saistās ar politiskiem mērķiem. Kādi varētu būtu šo divu mērķi? Un ko tie maksātu Latvijai?
Ka SC saņem bagātīgus atbalstus no apslēptiem avotiem norāda astronomiskās summas, bez kādām partijas plašā vēlēsanu kampaņa nebūtu bijusi iespējama. Partijas, ar ierobežotiem līdzekļiem, neko tik plašu atļauies nevar.
Vai gan tas nesmird pēc oligarchijas?
Un nevar arī nejautāt, kas gan īsti ir orķestrējis pašas vēlēšanas – reformists Zatlers vai SC? Ka SC ir ņēmis aktīvu dalību pie 10-tās Saeimas likvidēšanas, norāda skaitļi – 95% nav iespējamas bez SC pilnīga atbalsta.
Un vai aiz jaunās ZRP dibināšanas arī nav stāvējis Saskaņu Centrs? Jo vairāk latviešu partiju, jo lielāka šķelšanās, un vai SC nevarēja (tikai pa jokam) pamēģināt atbrīvoties no populārās Vienotības? Bet Vienotība, kaut gan zaudējusi vienu trešo no sava svara, stāv tikai pāris soļus aiz ZRP; tāpēc Saskaņu Centram nekas cits neatliek, kā Vienotību izslēgt.
Ar 31:42 SC nevar spēlēt pirmo vijoli.
Liekas gan, no Zatlera un Dombrovska partijām daudz pāri nebūtu palicis, jā vēlētāji būtu pazinuši šos vīrus.
Un par ko gan lai balso, ja tādi kā Zatlers un Dombrovskis noraida nacionālu koāliciju?
Tāpēc, tiem diviem – un viņu atbalstītājiem – ir laiks nomest maskas un ķerties pie Latvijas darba, kam viņi ir apsolījuši veltīt laiku un talantu.
Bet vēl vēlamāka būtu resignēšanās!
Reiz atvērta, Pandoras lāde netaisās ciet, un jautājumi krīt kā krusa.
Labais lasītāj, vai arī Tev būtu kas sakāms?
Hilda Smeķe
Falsifying history
2009/09/05
It appears that very few understand what really happened. The "Russian Revolution" was actually a revolution of non Russians. Lenin realized that a power base could be built by promising independence for the captive nations. The famous Latvian Riflemen supported Lenin for this reason and not because of some Communist ideals. Result was an Imperial Russia without Finland, the Baltic States and Poland. Many of Lenins non Russian supporters ended up in high offices in Moscow. Russia was now more Russian than ever and the old Imperial Bureaucracy resented the non Russian element being in powerful positions. Stalin and his gang built their power base on this old bureaucracy that yearned to restore Imperial Russia to its former glory. Those who had fought for independence for the Captive Nations were obstacles. This required that the opposition to this had to be eliminated, thus the Great Purges and show trials of the late thirties. The Second World War provided an opportunity to expand the Russian Empire one again. Formula was always the same: Send in the Red Army, then the Security Organs and arrest the top strata of the occupied nation. Then execute and/or deport (not to return) the arrested to the Gulags in the far north or east. Then begins the process of "russification" which is pure and simple intentional genocide as defined by the United Nations. Moscows Imperialists know that occupied territory is not "safe for Moscow" unless the indigenous population has been deported and diluted with Russians to the point where the national element is no longer a threat to Moscows objectives.
Vladimir Putin (Putler) is obviously ashamed of Russias recent past. That is why history has to be re-written so that he can continue the same old Imperialism. It was never about "Communism".
Vladimir Putin (Putler) is obviously ashamed of Russias recent past. That is why history has to be re-written so that he can continue the same old Imperialism. It was never about "Communism".
Franks Gordons: Briesmoņi bija abi
2009/07/24
Skaidri vārdi Telavivas laikrakstā
Izraēlas apmēram septiņu miljonu iedzīvotāju vidū ir kāds miljons krievvalodīgo. Šai lasītāju saimei domāts vienīgais dienas laikraksts krievu valodā – "Vesti", kuras galvenais politiskais komentētājs ir Jakovs Šauss. Nupat šajā avīzē parādījies visai pārliecinošs Šausa raksts par nacismu un staļinismu. Raksta nosaukums ir "Buridana ēzelis starp diviem briesmoņiem" – metafora ņemta no romiešu fabulas par ēzeli, kas nevarēja izšķirties starp diviem vienādiem siena kušķiem un tā arī neēdis nosprāga... Padomju propagandas stereotipi diemžēl iestrēguši dažu krievvalodīgo izraēliešu galvās, konstatē Šauss un nu tiecas ieviest skaidrību, vērojot zināmu apjukumu, ko šīs avīzes lasītāju vidū radījusi EDSO Parlamentārās asamblejas rezolūcija, kas pielīdzina staļinisko režīmu nacistiskajam.
Staļins nevar attaisnot Hitleru un Hitlers nevar attaisnot Staļinu, uzsver Šauss.
Katram diktatoram vajadzīga armija. Iekarojumu, karagājienu labad Staļins 1939. gadā noslēdza līgumu ar Hitleru. Staļins ilgi pirms Hitlera uzbrukuma Padomju Savienībai izmantoja savu armiju bandītiskai agresijai pret Somiju, Poliju, Baltijas valstīm, Rumāniju, raksta Šauss.
Joprojām nav izskausts uzskats, ka Hitlers tiecās iznīcināt visus ebrejus, bet Staļina zemē viņi izdzīvoja. Jakovs Šauss te ievieš skaidrību, norādot, ka padomju lēģeros ebreji gāja bojā kā meņševiki un eseri, kā trockisti un buharinieši, kā kaitnieki un spiegi, kā kosmopolīti un indētāji. Jā, gulagā viņus nesūtīja uz gāzes kamerām. Padomju Savienība bija daudz nabadzīgāka par Vāciju. Kolimā un Vorkutā cilvēki sadega salā vienā ziemā – kāpēc bija jātērējas dārgai tehnikai vai munīcijai? Šauss raksta: "Sešus miljonus ebreju nogalināja Hitlers, bet Staļins, kas parakstīja ar viņu papildus paktam par neuzbrukšanu arī draudzības līgumu, vairāk nekā visi pārējie sekmēja šā drausmīgā skaitļa parādīšanos. Padomju robežsargi šāva uz bēgļiem no Polijas, kur ebrejus jau sadzina geto."
Maz ir tādu, kas gatavi izprast Baltijas valstu dramatisko vēsturi, konstatē Šauss un atgādina, ka "vispirms tās okupēja Padomju Savienība, un tur jau 1940. gadā sākās drausmīgas represijas, simttūkstošu cilvēku deportācijas. Diez vai Baltijas valstu iedzīvotāji, ja tās būtu joprojām neatkarīgas, apsveiktu 1941. gadā nacistu iebrukumu".
Baltijas valstīs, norāda Šauss, nedrīkst slavināt Hitleru, un skolās pēta holokausta vēsturi. Neviens no viņu vadītājiem nenoliedz PSRS uzvaru pār Vāciju, bet viņi ir tiesīgi paust nožēlu par savu valstu otrreizējo okupāciju pēc šīs uzvaras un neapbrīnot padomju armiju, kas iznīcināja milzīgu viņu tautiešu daļu ne jau kaujas laukā. Abi totalitārie režīmi bija briesmoņi, un Jakova Šausa nopelns ir tas, ka viņš tiecas apgaismot prāva lasītāju pulka prātus.
Izraēlas apmēram septiņu miljonu iedzīvotāju vidū ir kāds miljons krievvalodīgo. Šai lasītāju saimei domāts vienīgais dienas laikraksts krievu valodā – "Vesti", kuras galvenais politiskais komentētājs ir Jakovs Šauss. Nupat šajā avīzē parādījies visai pārliecinošs Šausa raksts par nacismu un staļinismu. Raksta nosaukums ir "Buridana ēzelis starp diviem briesmoņiem" – metafora ņemta no romiešu fabulas par ēzeli, kas nevarēja izšķirties starp diviem vienādiem siena kušķiem un tā arī neēdis nosprāga... Padomju propagandas stereotipi diemžēl iestrēguši dažu krievvalodīgo izraēliešu galvās, konstatē Šauss un nu tiecas ieviest skaidrību, vērojot zināmu apjukumu, ko šīs avīzes lasītāju vidū radījusi EDSO Parlamentārās asamblejas rezolūcija, kas pielīdzina staļinisko režīmu nacistiskajam.
Staļins nevar attaisnot Hitleru un Hitlers nevar attaisnot Staļinu, uzsver Šauss.
Katram diktatoram vajadzīga armija. Iekarojumu, karagājienu labad Staļins 1939. gadā noslēdza līgumu ar Hitleru. Staļins ilgi pirms Hitlera uzbrukuma Padomju Savienībai izmantoja savu armiju bandītiskai agresijai pret Somiju, Poliju, Baltijas valstīm, Rumāniju, raksta Šauss.
Joprojām nav izskausts uzskats, ka Hitlers tiecās iznīcināt visus ebrejus, bet Staļina zemē viņi izdzīvoja. Jakovs Šauss te ievieš skaidrību, norādot, ka padomju lēģeros ebreji gāja bojā kā meņševiki un eseri, kā trockisti un buharinieši, kā kaitnieki un spiegi, kā kosmopolīti un indētāji. Jā, gulagā viņus nesūtīja uz gāzes kamerām. Padomju Savienība bija daudz nabadzīgāka par Vāciju. Kolimā un Vorkutā cilvēki sadega salā vienā ziemā – kāpēc bija jātērējas dārgai tehnikai vai munīcijai? Šauss raksta: "Sešus miljonus ebreju nogalināja Hitlers, bet Staļins, kas parakstīja ar viņu papildus paktam par neuzbrukšanu arī draudzības līgumu, vairāk nekā visi pārējie sekmēja šā drausmīgā skaitļa parādīšanos. Padomju robežsargi šāva uz bēgļiem no Polijas, kur ebrejus jau sadzina geto."
Maz ir tādu, kas gatavi izprast Baltijas valstu dramatisko vēsturi, konstatē Šauss un atgādina, ka "vispirms tās okupēja Padomju Savienība, un tur jau 1940. gadā sākās drausmīgas represijas, simttūkstošu cilvēku deportācijas. Diez vai Baltijas valstu iedzīvotāji, ja tās būtu joprojām neatkarīgas, apsveiktu 1941. gadā nacistu iebrukumu".
Baltijas valstīs, norāda Šauss, nedrīkst slavināt Hitleru, un skolās pēta holokausta vēsturi. Neviens no viņu vadītājiem nenoliedz PSRS uzvaru pār Vāciju, bet viņi ir tiesīgi paust nožēlu par savu valstu otrreizējo okupāciju pēc šīs uzvaras un neapbrīnot padomju armiju, kas iznīcināja milzīgu viņu tautiešu daļu ne jau kaujas laukā. Abi totalitārie režīmi bija briesmoņi, un Jakova Šausa nopelns ir tas, ka viņš tiecas apgaismot prāva lasītāju pulka prātus.
Georgian Request
2008/09/01
Subject: GEORGIAN REQUEST;Edward Lucas; 3rd Cold War Date: Sun, 31 Aug 2008 18:06:14 +0300
FROM GEORGIA:
Dear Friends,
I have a request to all, who loves Georgia, loves Georgian people and herewith your own motherland. With our patriarch's consecraste, who has a wish, on Monday, 1th of september, at 15:00 (georgian time) (14:00 Estonia Time) (13:00 London Time) all must come out in street and make a live chain to make a world and at first Russia to see, that Georgia is united and we are together, georgians an all who loves georgia. Please make this request extend to everybody, with your friends, in place where you live and express your support to Georgia and to georgian people.
God Bless us all
Beka Gonashvili (member of men's ensemble which sang in Estonia).
From Edward Lucas: Here is a quick draft shopping list of possible reactions to the Georgia crisis (I am back properly from holiday next week). I would be interested in all thoughts about priorities, practicalities, desirabilities. Please post comments on my blogsite edwardlucas.blogspot.com
1) A "Georgia Solidarity Campaign" to lobby hard for a full troop withdrawal, NATO soldiers in Georgia (see the "Checkpoint Georgia" article by ex-ambassador Donald Maclarin in today's Telegraph). International brigade of volunteers to help Georgia. Visa free travel to EU and US for Georgian (and Ukrainian) passport-holders.
2) Sweden and Finland into NATO ASAP
3) Big counter-attack on information warfare, expose Kremlin lies, inventions, distortions of history. Hit hard on Katyn, Gulag denial, Stalin nostalgia.
4) Sue Chekists everywhere--Strasbourg, Hague, any western court (Can't someone in Spain get Pinochet-style arrest warrant out?) Make them scared to travel.
5) Use separatist weapon against Chekists Idel-Ural, Tatarstan, Chechnya
6) Stop talking about "Russia". These guys aren't Russia. They are criminal gang of bullies, crooks and murderers who have hijacked Russia.
7) Demand Germany and Netherlands pull out of Nord Stream
8) Build up NATO presence in Baltic states (Balts provide the buildings, other NATO countries the people)
9) Constant name and shame of Chekist allies and stooges in Europe. What the **** is Cyprus doing?
10) Attack them financially. Raid Raiffeisen Bank, find out who owns Gunvor, RosUkrEnergo. Make all contact with Chekist-run commercial entitities toxic to reputations. Without bankers, auditors, lawyers etc they will find life much more difficult.
This was a full-page piece in today's Daily Telegraph. Saturday, August 30, 2008 Putin's pipeline to power.
Russia is fighting a new Cold War with banks and pipelines, not tanks and warplanes By Edward Lucas
In classical mythology, Georgia was the land where the Argonauts had to harness bulls with bronze hooves to win the Golden Fleece. Modern Georgia is the source of a treasure scarcely less precious: oil and gas from central Asia and the Caspian, piped along the only east-west energy corridor that Russia does not control. But whereas Jason and his comrades triumphed, our quest has ended in humiliating failure.
As the occupying power in Georgia, Russia can close or destroy those pipelines whenever it wishes. The only country in the region that even came close to sharing Western values, one vital for our energy security, has been humiliatingly defeated and dismembered.
As politicians and voters in the free world return from their holidays, two big questions require answering. What happens next? And how do we stop it?
Decoding the Kremlin's precise intentions is as tricky now as it was in the days of Kremlinology – a discipline as archaic as Morse code. But the outlines are clear.
Russia wants to recreate a "lite" version of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe and to neutralise the rest of the continent. Unlike the old Cold War, military action is a last resort: for the most part, it is banks and pipelines, not tanks and warplanes, that are doing the dirty work.
This may sound strange, given what has happened in Georgia. But it is vital to realise that this was not the beginning of a new Russian push, but part of something that began in the mid-1990s.
Russia has nobbled Belarus – the only other country, apart from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, that is ready to recognise the new statelets of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It props up the narco-state of Tajikistan, cossets the dictatorship in Uzbekistan and woos the benighted despots of Turkmenistan. It has a cautious alliance with China, in the form of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, an outfit dedicated to fighting "extremism, terrorism and separatism" (although this last "-ism" has evidently been forgotten when it comes to Georgia).
It has stitched up energy deals in North Africa; it flirts with Iran and sells weapons to Hugo Chavez, the America-hating windbag who runs Venezuela. And by using energy diplomacy and divide-and-rule tactics, it is stitching up Europe country by country, from Cyprus to the Netherlands.
And it works. Over the crisis in Georgia, Europe has shown astonishing softness. The leaders of the EU have been all but invisible.
Where is the supposed foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana? Or the foreign-affairs commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner? Meanwhile, Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, has been humiliated by the blatant Russian breaches of the ceasefire agreement that he negotiated. Europe's weakness is the result of multiple forms of soft-headedness and short-sightedness.
Partly it is simple anti-Americanism: if Vladimir Putin is making life difficult for George Bush, he must be a good guy. That attitude lies behind the astonishing opinion polls in countries such as Germany, which show that people have more trust in xenophobic, authoritarian Russia than they do in the world's most powerful democracy.
There is also a mistaken belief that Russia is an ally in the struggle against globalisation: here is a country, argue intellectuals such as the British historian Correlli Barnett, that does not let itself be pushed around by multinational companies and the meddling do-gooders of the self-appointed "international community".
But this is to misunderstand Russia under its kleptocratic and chauvinist ex-KGB rulers. Russia likes multilateral organisations, so long as it dominates them. It runs a whole bunch: for example, the "Commonwealth of Independent States", which it is using to legitimise its occupation of Georgia.
Russia is also advocating a new pan-European security organisation, with formal legal status. This, it hopes, will exclude the United States, and tie up the West in the knots of international law, so that military intervention of the kind seen in the former Yugoslavia becomes all but impossible.
Similarly, although the Kremlin makes life difficult domestically for Western oil companies and tightly restricts foreign investment in any industry that it dubs "strategic" (which potentially covers almost anything), it is another story abroad. Russia delights in the possibilities of the global economy. If regulators in New York are sniffy about listing stolen companies on the stock exchange, there is always London. And if you fail even London's undemanding test, Dubai, Bombay and Shanghai await with open arms.
Russia also uses its colossal war chest, fuelled by oil and gas revenues, to buy up assets in other countries. And that is the taproot of European softness: money.
In the Cold War, doing business with the Soviet Union was a rare and suspicious activity. Now Russia has penetrated our markets and businesses to a huge degree. Energy companies such as Austria's OMV, Germany's E.ON and Italy's ENI work hand-in-glove with outfits such as Gazprom, which is nominally Russia's biggest company, but better described as the gas division of Kremlin, Inc.
This directly affects politics. Germany, with Russia, is building the Nord Stream gas pipeline along the Baltic seabed to bypass Poland. Russia has already cut off energy supplies to punish Lithuania, the Czech Republic and other countries. When Nord Stream is built, it will be able to do the same to Poland.
Yet even now, after a clear and brutal demonstration of Russian imperialism, Germany refuses to consider cancelling the pipeline. Angela Merkel was willing to pay a high-profile visit to the Baltic states – a likely target for Russia's next push westwards – to offer support. But she would not even contemplate ending her energy alliance with Russia.
And it is hard to see this changing: European consumers will not pay hugely higher energy prices to finance alternative supplies, nor will politicians give the EU the weight it needs to bargain properly with Russia (a country, don't forget, that is three times smaller in population than the EU, with an economy roughly a tenth of the size).
With the EU and Nato hopelessly divided, Russia can dismiss our toothless whimpers about Georgia. That leaves Eastern Europe to base its security on the United States.
Yet even America's willingness to confront Russia is limited. Every incoming president since Bill Clinton has criticised his predecessor for being soft on Russia. But none has proved any better. For all John McCain's fighting talk, and Barack Obama's belated belligerence, neither man will be able to take a hard line. America needs Russia – for nuclear security, to hold back Iran, to contain North Korea, as a supply route to Afghanistan, in hunting down terrorists. And Russia knows it. If the mood in Washington is frosty, the Kremlin need only flirt more intensively with Iran, Venezuela and China, or withhold co-operation on some pressing topic, and America will buckle.
On top of all that, Russia's leaders have a massively secure position at home. Their central bank has nearly $600 billion in hard-currency reserves, while their popularity is far greater than the Politburo ever dreamed of. Mr Putin, and the war in Georgia, are acclaimed – a view stoked by the docile media, which portrayed the conflict as a valiant crusade against genocide and Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili as a murderous fascist.
Abroad, Russia senses that power in the world is shifting east and south, to countries such as India and China, which see Georgia very differently. They may not much like separatism, but they also think that the West is practising double standards: America would not tolerate the Kremlin's meddling in its backyard, so why should Russia have to put up with an America protégé in the Caucasus?
The German philosopher GF Hegel wrote that the owl of Minerva spreads her wings only at dusk: we perceive historical changes only when they are almost complete. We have enjoyed an extraordinary 20-year period in which Russia was weak and seemingly benign. Europe became (mostly) whole and free.
The idea that the continent could again become a battleground between East and West is unwelcome, and to many still inconceivable. But it is happening: and our resurgent enemy seemingly holds most of the cards.
There is, however, one chink of light, for us if not for the Russians. In the long term, the Putin regime means catastrophe for his country. The political system is opaque and fossilised, unable to respond to the needs of a changing economy or to rein in corruption, let alone deal with the fast-growing Muslim population, which has soared to 25 million – a 40 per cent rise since 1989 – as the birthrate among the Slavs has plunged. Modernisation of public services and infrastructure, in a country awash with money, has been dismally slow.
Foreign adventures are the traditional way for autocratic rulers to distract public opinion from problems at home, and Russia is no exception. The regime running Russia will come unstuck in the end. But the cost in the meantime will be dreadful.
This was this week's Europe View. In deference to taste and decency I have renamed Khuiyovich as Shutnik (which means "Joker" in Russian). Amazingly, some readers of The Economist website seem not to realise that this is satire and have been crossly demanding the "original text" and denouncing the "forgery". Shades of 1993...
Europe.view
What Russia will do next Aug 28th 2008 From Economist.com
A secret e-mail to Mr Putin reaches our columnist
From:oleg.shutnik@svr.ru
To:vvp@gov.ru
Cc:dam@kremlin.ru
ESTEEMED Vladimir Vladimirovich!
As director of the operational task-force of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, I present my compliments to you personally at the conclusion of the initial military-political phase of Operation "Return".
The penetration by this service and its sister organisations of decision-making structures in the enemy camp has long given us advance warning of European Union and NATO plans, and a substantial ability to influence them. Even we, however, did not expect such torpor and weakness from the enemy. We see empty words but no readiness for serious resistance. Indeed, some western commentators and politicians have praised our actions as justified, including in some cases those who have received no payment or other inducements. We can proceed confidently.
As we underline the disadvantages of bad relations and highlight the advantages of good ones, our main ally is the electoral cycle. Voters, politicians and other decision-makers will become increasingly aware that if they resist us, they will pay a heavy price; but if they cooperate, they will benefit.
We will extend the intimidation, harassment and expropriation of British, American, Polish and Czech companies active in our domestic market and as energy customers, while at the same time offering further preferential treatment to those from countries that are politically friendly, especially France, Italy and Germany. Are big European companies willing to sacrifice billions of euros in lost exports or higher energy costs by indulging their politicians' desire to grandstand and moralise? We think not.
We should visibly intensify our activity in non-western financial centres, chiefly Dubai, Mumbai and Shanghai, to show western capital markets, particularly London and New York, the loss of business that they face by their governments' intransigent behaviour.
Similarly, the next American president will face a stark choice between the imminent prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran or the wasting asset of involvement in a Europe that does not wish to defend itself.
The electoral cycle in the enemy camp in coming months should deliver great victories to our side: by the year-end we expect Ukraine and Lithuania to abandon the enemy camp. But plans for further escalation are ready as needed. In Crimea, Islamic extremists, guided by our colleagues in Teheran and Damascus, can attack Russian passport-holders. The Ukrainian authorities, partly due to their own incompetence and partly thanks to our disruptive activities, will be unable to stop these atrocities. Our agents in the local population can therefore set up armed self-defence militias. These will clash with the Ukrainian police and army. Our forces can then intervene as peacekeepers, recreating the scenario that has played out so successfully in Georgia.
In the Baltic, provocations will be by nationalist hooligan gangs, supposedly acting as patriots, demanding ethnic cleansing of all Russian-speakers from Estonia and Latvia. Our compatriots there will also establish self-defence militias, which will appeal to us for protection from both the hooligans and from the organs of state power. In the case of Lithuania, our sponsored extremist groups can mount terrorist attacks on military transit to the Kaliningrad region, giving us the chance to demand, and provide, suitable security protection to them.
We can also launch deniable cyber-attacks against Poland and the Czech Republic, crippling official websites and disrupting the banking system. There remains only the problem of certain propagandists in the enemy media who
Editor's note: "Shutnik"—the surname of the author of this email—is the Russian word for "Joker". Whether this affects the authenticity of the above material is for readers to decide.
Window on Eurasia: The Third Cold War Has Begun, Karaganov Says Paul Goble.
Vienna, August 31 – Most commentators who talk about a new cold war emerging after the events in Georgia are referring only to the geopolitical contest between the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance after World War II, but one of Moscow's most interesting commentators says that any new cold war will not be the second but the third the two sides have engaged in.
By pointing out that there were two earlier such competitions – one prior to the second world war which the USSR ultimately won in the course of that military conflict and the second, better-known one, which Moscow lost decisively, Sergei Karaganov provides some important insights into what the new conflict is likely to look like from Moscow's perspective.
In a lengthy article in "Rossiiskaya gazeta," the head of Moscow's Council on Foreign and Defense Policy says that he is convinced that the world is once again being divided between "ours and theirs," in which "ours" will be defended regardless of what they do and "theirs" will be condemned no matter how they act (www.rg.ru/2008/08/29/karaganov.html).
According to Karaganov, the new era of conflict reflects both the redistribution of resources in the world following the end of the second cold war, a development that he suggests will be long term, and the rise of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states after the 1991 settlement, a temporary phenomenon but "for those who are losing – a matter of here and now."
After gaining economically in the immediate wake of the end of the second cold war, the "old" West started to lose out rapidly because increases in the price of oil and gas led to a massive transfer of resources away from the United States and Europe to those states, including Russia, where these critical energy resources came from.
Many of these energy suppliers, again including Russia, were authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, the Moscow analyst says, and this led to the rise of "authoritarian capitalism" as "the ideological system of the new 'enemy.'" The West needed an enemy to unite, he insists, but its effort to create "'a union of democracies'" against the authoritarian states was "tragicomic."
Other changes in the world – including the proliferation of nuclear weapons and America's loss of prestige around the world because of its actions in Iraq – simply reinforced this development, and effort after September 11th to use counter-terrorism as a unifying force proved a failure.
Thus, Karaganov continues, a new cold war became likely. The West is promoting it as a means to recover the positions it has lost. And Moscow has assisted this effort not only because Russia "has become a symbol and incarnation" of the changes the West opposes but also because Moscow has behaved in ways in Georgia and elsewhere that have only added to that image.
Both in the cold wars of the past and in the one starting now, the Moscow specialist on international relations says, geopolitics is more significant than ideology, and that reality, one often overlooked in recent commentaries, is likely to define the course of the international divide now opening.
Russia has certain advantages and certain disadvantages in this renewed struggle, Karaganov argues. On the one hand, it has a freer society and a richer one than in the past, making it more attractive to many. But on the other, it lacks the resources in terms of space, population and GDP that the Soviet Union had, making it less able to compete.
At the same time, however, Russia's "corrupt state capitalism" is something "hardly any of the thinking and patriotically inclined Russians" are happy about, he says, but the West has not focused on that political and economic elite in this new "cold war" but rather on Russia itself and thus on all Russians.
And it is worth remembering that what he calls "the old West" is now weaker than it was as well. The standing of the U.S. in the world has fallen precipitously because of its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this group of states controls a much smaller portion of the world's population and GDP than it did 30 years ago.
That helps to explain what has happened in Georgia. According to Karaganov, "Russia had no other way out" except to respond militarily to "the aggression of Tbilisi and of the forces standing behind" it and then to seal its gains on the ground by extending diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While many are still focusing on those developments alone, "the main goal" of the current rise in tensions involves not Georgia but the potential entry of Ukraine into NATO. "That is absolutely unacceptable for Russia. And even if we were to suddenly agree to this, the logic of events would all the same lead to a confrontation and possibly a military one."
In order to block this, Moscow must denounce the Russia-NATO Council that when set up ten years ago opened the way to the expansion eastward of the Western alliance and was denounced at the time by some as "'a second Brest peace,'" a reference to the treaty Lenin signed with the Germans in 1918 that sacrificed Russian territory to win time for the Bolsheviks.
"It is time to recognize that this union is not only a relic of 'the cold war,' but that it is one of the basic instruments of its rebirth," Karaganov says.
Two other reports from Moscow about the possibility of a new cold war are worthy of note. First of all, Aleksandr Prokhanov, the editor of the nationalist newspaper "Zavtra," said on Ekho Moskvy that he welcomed such a conflict because "for Russia, a cold war today represents salvation" (
Without one, he said, Russia would degenerate and die, whereas with one, its citizens will not only bring their money home but focus on developing their country so that it will not lose this latest episode of what he sees as the longstanding and inevitable conflict between Russia and the West.
And for those who are frightened that a new cold war will lead to a hot one, Prokhanov had this to day: "A third world war is not beginning [because] the Americans are not in a position to conduct [it]. They have a terrible crisis, their civilization is collapsing and they have" incurred huge debts at home and abroad.
And second, Aleksandr Dugin's nationalist Eurasian website reported today that sources in the Russian ministry of education say that they are preparing a new required course for Russian schools on geopolitics, a course that they suggest may displace current courses in geography (evrazia.org/n.php?id893).
The officials reportedly said that the course will explain to students "how to build an empire" as well as "who its enemies and friends are," content that almost certainly would lead many Russian students to conclude that they and their parents have no option but to restore an empire and to engage in a cold war with the West.
FROM GEORGIA:
Dear Friends,
I have a request to all, who loves Georgia, loves Georgian people and herewith your own motherland. With our patriarch's consecraste, who has a wish, on Monday, 1th of september, at 15:00 (georgian time) (14:00 Estonia Time) (13:00 London Time) all must come out in street and make a live chain to make a world and at first Russia to see, that Georgia is united and we are together, georgians an all who loves georgia. Please make this request extend to everybody, with your friends, in place where you live and express your support to Georgia and to georgian people.
God Bless us all
Beka Gonashvili (member of men's ensemble which sang in Estonia).
From Edward Lucas: Here is a quick draft shopping list of possible reactions to the Georgia crisis (I am back properly from holiday next week). I would be interested in all thoughts about priorities, practicalities, desirabilities. Please post comments on my blogsite edwardlucas.blogspot.com
1) A "Georgia Solidarity Campaign" to lobby hard for a full troop withdrawal, NATO soldiers in Georgia (see the "Checkpoint Georgia" article by ex-ambassador Donald Maclarin in today's Telegraph). International brigade of volunteers to help Georgia. Visa free travel to EU and US for Georgian (and Ukrainian) passport-holders.
2) Sweden and Finland into NATO ASAP
3) Big counter-attack on information warfare, expose Kremlin lies, inventions, distortions of history. Hit hard on Katyn, Gulag denial, Stalin nostalgia.
4) Sue Chekists everywhere--Strasbourg, Hague, any western court (Can't someone in Spain get Pinochet-style arrest warrant out?) Make them scared to travel.
5) Use separatist weapon against Chekists Idel-Ural, Tatarstan, Chechnya
6) Stop talking about "Russia". These guys aren't Russia. They are criminal gang of bullies, crooks and murderers who have hijacked Russia.
7) Demand Germany and Netherlands pull out of Nord Stream
8) Build up NATO presence in Baltic states (Balts provide the buildings, other NATO countries the people)
9) Constant name and shame of Chekist allies and stooges in Europe. What the **** is Cyprus doing?
10) Attack them financially. Raid Raiffeisen Bank, find out who owns Gunvor, RosUkrEnergo. Make all contact with Chekist-run commercial entitities toxic to reputations. Without bankers, auditors, lawyers etc they will find life much more difficult.
This was a full-page piece in today's Daily Telegraph. Saturday, August 30, 2008 Putin's pipeline to power.
Russia is fighting a new Cold War with banks and pipelines, not tanks and warplanes By Edward Lucas
In classical mythology, Georgia was the land where the Argonauts had to harness bulls with bronze hooves to win the Golden Fleece. Modern Georgia is the source of a treasure scarcely less precious: oil and gas from central Asia and the Caspian, piped along the only east-west energy corridor that Russia does not control. But whereas Jason and his comrades triumphed, our quest has ended in humiliating failure.
As the occupying power in Georgia, Russia can close or destroy those pipelines whenever it wishes. The only country in the region that even came close to sharing Western values, one vital for our energy security, has been humiliatingly defeated and dismembered.
As politicians and voters in the free world return from their holidays, two big questions require answering. What happens next? And how do we stop it?
Decoding the Kremlin's precise intentions is as tricky now as it was in the days of Kremlinology – a discipline as archaic as Morse code. But the outlines are clear.
Russia wants to recreate a "lite" version of the Soviet empire in eastern Europe and to neutralise the rest of the continent. Unlike the old Cold War, military action is a last resort: for the most part, it is banks and pipelines, not tanks and warplanes, that are doing the dirty work.
This may sound strange, given what has happened in Georgia. But it is vital to realise that this was not the beginning of a new Russian push, but part of something that began in the mid-1990s.
Russia has nobbled Belarus – the only other country, apart from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, that is ready to recognise the new statelets of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It props up the narco-state of Tajikistan, cossets the dictatorship in Uzbekistan and woos the benighted despots of Turkmenistan. It has a cautious alliance with China, in the form of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, an outfit dedicated to fighting "extremism, terrorism and separatism" (although this last "-ism" has evidently been forgotten when it comes to Georgia).
It has stitched up energy deals in North Africa; it flirts with Iran and sells weapons to Hugo Chavez, the America-hating windbag who runs Venezuela. And by using energy diplomacy and divide-and-rule tactics, it is stitching up Europe country by country, from Cyprus to the Netherlands.
And it works. Over the crisis in Georgia, Europe has shown astonishing softness. The leaders of the EU have been all but invisible.
Where is the supposed foreign-policy chief, Javier Solana? Or the foreign-affairs commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner? Meanwhile, Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, has been humiliated by the blatant Russian breaches of the ceasefire agreement that he negotiated. Europe's weakness is the result of multiple forms of soft-headedness and short-sightedness.
Partly it is simple anti-Americanism: if Vladimir Putin is making life difficult for George Bush, he must be a good guy. That attitude lies behind the astonishing opinion polls in countries such as Germany, which show that people have more trust in xenophobic, authoritarian Russia than they do in the world's most powerful democracy.
There is also a mistaken belief that Russia is an ally in the struggle against globalisation: here is a country, argue intellectuals such as the British historian Correlli Barnett, that does not let itself be pushed around by multinational companies and the meddling do-gooders of the self-appointed "international community".
But this is to misunderstand Russia under its kleptocratic and chauvinist ex-KGB rulers. Russia likes multilateral organisations, so long as it dominates them. It runs a whole bunch: for example, the "Commonwealth of Independent States", which it is using to legitimise its occupation of Georgia.
Russia is also advocating a new pan-European security organisation, with formal legal status. This, it hopes, will exclude the United States, and tie up the West in the knots of international law, so that military intervention of the kind seen in the former Yugoslavia becomes all but impossible.
Similarly, although the Kremlin makes life difficult domestically for Western oil companies and tightly restricts foreign investment in any industry that it dubs "strategic" (which potentially covers almost anything), it is another story abroad. Russia delights in the possibilities of the global economy. If regulators in New York are sniffy about listing stolen companies on the stock exchange, there is always London. And if you fail even London's undemanding test, Dubai, Bombay and Shanghai await with open arms.
Russia also uses its colossal war chest, fuelled by oil and gas revenues, to buy up assets in other countries. And that is the taproot of European softness: money.
In the Cold War, doing business with the Soviet Union was a rare and suspicious activity. Now Russia has penetrated our markets and businesses to a huge degree. Energy companies such as Austria's OMV, Germany's E.ON and Italy's ENI work hand-in-glove with outfits such as Gazprom, which is nominally Russia's biggest company, but better described as the gas division of Kremlin, Inc.
This directly affects politics. Germany, with Russia, is building the Nord Stream gas pipeline along the Baltic seabed to bypass Poland. Russia has already cut off energy supplies to punish Lithuania, the Czech Republic and other countries. When Nord Stream is built, it will be able to do the same to Poland.
Yet even now, after a clear and brutal demonstration of Russian imperialism, Germany refuses to consider cancelling the pipeline. Angela Merkel was willing to pay a high-profile visit to the Baltic states – a likely target for Russia's next push westwards – to offer support. But she would not even contemplate ending her energy alliance with Russia.
And it is hard to see this changing: European consumers will not pay hugely higher energy prices to finance alternative supplies, nor will politicians give the EU the weight it needs to bargain properly with Russia (a country, don't forget, that is three times smaller in population than the EU, with an economy roughly a tenth of the size).
With the EU and Nato hopelessly divided, Russia can dismiss our toothless whimpers about Georgia. That leaves Eastern Europe to base its security on the United States.
Yet even America's willingness to confront Russia is limited. Every incoming president since Bill Clinton has criticised his predecessor for being soft on Russia. But none has proved any better. For all John McCain's fighting talk, and Barack Obama's belated belligerence, neither man will be able to take a hard line. America needs Russia – for nuclear security, to hold back Iran, to contain North Korea, as a supply route to Afghanistan, in hunting down terrorists. And Russia knows it. If the mood in Washington is frosty, the Kremlin need only flirt more intensively with Iran, Venezuela and China, or withhold co-operation on some pressing topic, and America will buckle.
On top of all that, Russia's leaders have a massively secure position at home. Their central bank has nearly $600 billion in hard-currency reserves, while their popularity is far greater than the Politburo ever dreamed of. Mr Putin, and the war in Georgia, are acclaimed – a view stoked by the docile media, which portrayed the conflict as a valiant crusade against genocide and Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili as a murderous fascist.
Abroad, Russia senses that power in the world is shifting east and south, to countries such as India and China, which see Georgia very differently. They may not much like separatism, but they also think that the West is practising double standards: America would not tolerate the Kremlin's meddling in its backyard, so why should Russia have to put up with an America protégé in the Caucasus?
The German philosopher GF Hegel wrote that the owl of Minerva spreads her wings only at dusk: we perceive historical changes only when they are almost complete. We have enjoyed an extraordinary 20-year period in which Russia was weak and seemingly benign. Europe became (mostly) whole and free.
The idea that the continent could again become a battleground between East and West is unwelcome, and to many still inconceivable. But it is happening: and our resurgent enemy seemingly holds most of the cards.
There is, however, one chink of light, for us if not for the Russians. In the long term, the Putin regime means catastrophe for his country. The political system is opaque and fossilised, unable to respond to the needs of a changing economy or to rein in corruption, let alone deal with the fast-growing Muslim population, which has soared to 25 million – a 40 per cent rise since 1989 – as the birthrate among the Slavs has plunged. Modernisation of public services and infrastructure, in a country awash with money, has been dismally slow.
Foreign adventures are the traditional way for autocratic rulers to distract public opinion from problems at home, and Russia is no exception. The regime running Russia will come unstuck in the end. But the cost in the meantime will be dreadful.
This was this week's Europe View. In deference to taste and decency I have renamed Khuiyovich as Shutnik (which means "Joker" in Russian). Amazingly, some readers of The Economist website seem not to realise that this is satire and have been crossly demanding the "original text" and denouncing the "forgery". Shades of 1993...
Europe.view
What Russia will do next Aug 28th 2008 From Economist.com
A secret e-mail to Mr Putin reaches our columnist
From:oleg.shutnik@svr.ru
To:vvp@gov.ru
Cc:dam@kremlin.ru
ESTEEMED Vladimir Vladimirovich!
As director of the operational task-force of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, I present my compliments to you personally at the conclusion of the initial military-political phase of Operation "Return".
The penetration by this service and its sister organisations of decision-making structures in the enemy camp has long given us advance warning of European Union and NATO plans, and a substantial ability to influence them. Even we, however, did not expect such torpor and weakness from the enemy. We see empty words but no readiness for serious resistance. Indeed, some western commentators and politicians have praised our actions as justified, including in some cases those who have received no payment or other inducements. We can proceed confidently.
As we underline the disadvantages of bad relations and highlight the advantages of good ones, our main ally is the electoral cycle. Voters, politicians and other decision-makers will become increasingly aware that if they resist us, they will pay a heavy price; but if they cooperate, they will benefit.
We will extend the intimidation, harassment and expropriation of British, American, Polish and Czech companies active in our domestic market and as energy customers, while at the same time offering further preferential treatment to those from countries that are politically friendly, especially France, Italy and Germany. Are big European companies willing to sacrifice billions of euros in lost exports or higher energy costs by indulging their politicians' desire to grandstand and moralise? We think not.
We should visibly intensify our activity in non-western financial centres, chiefly Dubai, Mumbai and Shanghai, to show western capital markets, particularly London and New York, the loss of business that they face by their governments' intransigent behaviour.
Similarly, the next American president will face a stark choice between the imminent prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran or the wasting asset of involvement in a Europe that does not wish to defend itself.
The electoral cycle in the enemy camp in coming months should deliver great victories to our side: by the year-end we expect Ukraine and Lithuania to abandon the enemy camp. But plans for further escalation are ready as needed. In Crimea, Islamic extremists, guided by our colleagues in Teheran and Damascus, can attack Russian passport-holders. The Ukrainian authorities, partly due to their own incompetence and partly thanks to our disruptive activities, will be unable to stop these atrocities. Our agents in the local population can therefore set up armed self-defence militias. These will clash with the Ukrainian police and army. Our forces can then intervene as peacekeepers, recreating the scenario that has played out so successfully in Georgia.
In the Baltic, provocations will be by nationalist hooligan gangs, supposedly acting as patriots, demanding ethnic cleansing of all Russian-speakers from Estonia and Latvia. Our compatriots there will also establish self-defence militias, which will appeal to us for protection from both the hooligans and from the organs of state power. In the case of Lithuania, our sponsored extremist groups can mount terrorist attacks on military transit to the Kaliningrad region, giving us the chance to demand, and provide, suitable security protection to them.
We can also launch deniable cyber-attacks against Poland and the Czech Republic, crippling official websites and disrupting the banking system. There remains only the problem of certain propagandists in the enemy media who
Editor's note: "Shutnik"—the surname of the author of this email—is the Russian word for "Joker". Whether this affects the authenticity of the above material is for readers to decide.
Window on Eurasia: The Third Cold War Has Begun, Karaganov Says Paul Goble.
Vienna, August 31 – Most commentators who talk about a new cold war emerging after the events in Georgia are referring only to the geopolitical contest between the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance after World War II, but one of Moscow's most interesting commentators says that any new cold war will not be the second but the third the two sides have engaged in.
By pointing out that there were two earlier such competitions – one prior to the second world war which the USSR ultimately won in the course of that military conflict and the second, better-known one, which Moscow lost decisively, Sergei Karaganov provides some important insights into what the new conflict is likely to look like from Moscow's perspective.
In a lengthy article in "Rossiiskaya gazeta," the head of Moscow's Council on Foreign and Defense Policy says that he is convinced that the world is once again being divided between "ours and theirs," in which "ours" will be defended regardless of what they do and "theirs" will be condemned no matter how they act (www.rg.ru/2008/08/29/karaganov.html).
According to Karaganov, the new era of conflict reflects both the redistribution of resources in the world following the end of the second cold war, a development that he suggests will be long term, and the rise of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states after the 1991 settlement, a temporary phenomenon but "for those who are losing – a matter of here and now."
After gaining economically in the immediate wake of the end of the second cold war, the "old" West started to lose out rapidly because increases in the price of oil and gas led to a massive transfer of resources away from the United States and Europe to those states, including Russia, where these critical energy resources came from.
Many of these energy suppliers, again including Russia, were authoritarian or semi-authoritarian, the Moscow analyst says, and this led to the rise of "authoritarian capitalism" as "the ideological system of the new 'enemy.'" The West needed an enemy to unite, he insists, but its effort to create "'a union of democracies'" against the authoritarian states was "tragicomic."
Other changes in the world – including the proliferation of nuclear weapons and America's loss of prestige around the world because of its actions in Iraq – simply reinforced this development, and effort after September 11th to use counter-terrorism as a unifying force proved a failure.
Thus, Karaganov continues, a new cold war became likely. The West is promoting it as a means to recover the positions it has lost. And Moscow has assisted this effort not only because Russia "has become a symbol and incarnation" of the changes the West opposes but also because Moscow has behaved in ways in Georgia and elsewhere that have only added to that image.
Both in the cold wars of the past and in the one starting now, the Moscow specialist on international relations says, geopolitics is more significant than ideology, and that reality, one often overlooked in recent commentaries, is likely to define the course of the international divide now opening.
Russia has certain advantages and certain disadvantages in this renewed struggle, Karaganov argues. On the one hand, it has a freer society and a richer one than in the past, making it more attractive to many. But on the other, it lacks the resources in terms of space, population and GDP that the Soviet Union had, making it less able to compete.
At the same time, however, Russia's "corrupt state capitalism" is something "hardly any of the thinking and patriotically inclined Russians" are happy about, he says, but the West has not focused on that political and economic elite in this new "cold war" but rather on Russia itself and thus on all Russians.
And it is worth remembering that what he calls "the old West" is now weaker than it was as well. The standing of the U.S. in the world has fallen precipitously because of its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this group of states controls a much smaller portion of the world's population and GDP than it did 30 years ago.
That helps to explain what has happened in Georgia. According to Karaganov, "Russia had no other way out" except to respond militarily to "the aggression of Tbilisi and of the forces standing behind" it and then to seal its gains on the ground by extending diplomatic recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While many are still focusing on those developments alone, "the main goal" of the current rise in tensions involves not Georgia but the potential entry of Ukraine into NATO. "That is absolutely unacceptable for Russia. And even if we were to suddenly agree to this, the logic of events would all the same lead to a confrontation and possibly a military one."
In order to block this, Moscow must denounce the Russia-NATO Council that when set up ten years ago opened the way to the expansion eastward of the Western alliance and was denounced at the time by some as "'a second Brest peace,'" a reference to the treaty Lenin signed with the Germans in 1918 that sacrificed Russian territory to win time for the Bolsheviks.
"It is time to recognize that this union is not only a relic of 'the cold war,' but that it is one of the basic instruments of its rebirth," Karaganov says.
Two other reports from Moscow about the possibility of a new cold war are worthy of note. First of all, Aleksandr Prokhanov, the editor of the nationalist newspaper "Zavtra," said on Ekho Moskvy that he welcomed such a conflict because "for Russia, a cold war today represents salvation" (
Without one, he said, Russia would degenerate and die, whereas with one, its citizens will not only bring their money home but focus on developing their country so that it will not lose this latest episode of what he sees as the longstanding and inevitable conflict between Russia and the West.
And for those who are frightened that a new cold war will lead to a hot one, Prokhanov had this to day: "A third world war is not beginning [because] the Americans are not in a position to conduct [it]. They have a terrible crisis, their civilization is collapsing and they have" incurred huge debts at home and abroad.
And second, Aleksandr Dugin's nationalist Eurasian website reported today that sources in the Russian ministry of education say that they are preparing a new required course for Russian schools on geopolitics, a course that they suggest may displace current courses in geography (evrazia.org/n.php?id893).
The officials reportedly said that the course will explain to students "how to build an empire" as well as "who its enemies and friends are," content that almost certainly would lead many Russian students to conclude that they and their parents have no option but to restore an empire and to engage in a cold war with the West.
Serious and sustained waves
2008/08/26
Carl Bildt - August 26, 2008
The surge after today's Russian decision to demolish the old borders in the Caucasus has been high during the day - and will continue to be so over a significant period of time.
I have had conversations with a number of colleagues and will continue to have it tomorrow.
On Thursday, I meet with French Foreign Minister Kouchner and the Czech Republic ditto Schwarzenberg in Paris for discussions, among other things, before Monday's European summit in Brussels.
And have also had interviews for both Swedish and international media.
The fact that Russia will be relatively isolated in this policy, I do not think there need be no more doubt about that. In Europe, it would possibly be Belarus that chooses to follow the Russian line - I find it very hard to see that someone else would do it.
And also not either on the wider international level, there will be so many that will follow the Russian line. Major countries such as China, India, South Africa or Brazil will not do it.
Possibly can one find one or more allies. Cuba and Venezuela could well be the most obvious candidates.
It remains to be seen how Russia could push the various Central Asian States. Real genuine support for the Russian decision, there is certainly not - but possibly a fear of the consequences of failure to comply with a dictate from Moscow.
It can not be ruled out that it discreetly can threaten some of them even to start to play with their territorial integrity.
Russia will now draw up agreements on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance to these two areas. In practice, they are becoming Russian satellites - to imagine that South Ossetia in any respect could act as an independent state is the closest to challenging ridicule.
To all the troublesome aspects of this decision include the question of the rights of refugees to return.
Of the population of South Ossetia about a third was Georgians, but significant parts of them have now fled or been displaced. Will they be denied the opportunity to return?
Of the approximately 500 000 people who lived Abkhazia before the war in the early 1990s over 20% were ethnic abkasians, while the Georgians was the numerically largest national group. Most of them were forced to flee and only a small part has been able to return to the so-called Gali district in connection to the border with the rest of Georgia.
And now, some 10 000 or so Georgians and others were forced to flee from this and other areas of Abkazia. The likelihood that Russia will respect the decision of the United Nations and others to give them the right of return is, unfortunately, very small.
The surge after today's Russian decision to demolish the old borders in the Caucasus has been high during the day - and will continue to be so over a significant period of time.
I have had conversations with a number of colleagues and will continue to have it tomorrow.
On Thursday, I meet with French Foreign Minister Kouchner and the Czech Republic ditto Schwarzenberg in Paris for discussions, among other things, before Monday's European summit in Brussels.
And have also had interviews for both Swedish and international media.
The fact that Russia will be relatively isolated in this policy, I do not think there need be no more doubt about that. In Europe, it would possibly be Belarus that chooses to follow the Russian line - I find it very hard to see that someone else would do it.
And also not either on the wider international level, there will be so many that will follow the Russian line. Major countries such as China, India, South Africa or Brazil will not do it.
Possibly can one find one or more allies. Cuba and Venezuela could well be the most obvious candidates.
It remains to be seen how Russia could push the various Central Asian States. Real genuine support for the Russian decision, there is certainly not - but possibly a fear of the consequences of failure to comply with a dictate from Moscow.
It can not be ruled out that it discreetly can threaten some of them even to start to play with their territorial integrity.
Russia will now draw up agreements on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance to these two areas. In practice, they are becoming Russian satellites - to imagine that South Ossetia in any respect could act as an independent state is the closest to challenging ridicule.
To all the troublesome aspects of this decision include the question of the rights of refugees to return.
Of the population of South Ossetia about a third was Georgians, but significant parts of them have now fled or been displaced. Will they be denied the opportunity to return?
Of the approximately 500 000 people who lived Abkhazia before the war in the early 1990s over 20% were ethnic abkasians, while the Georgians was the numerically largest national group. Most of them were forced to flee and only a small part has been able to return to the so-called Gali district in connection to the border with the rest of Georgia.
And now, some 10 000 or so Georgians and others were forced to flee from this and other areas of Abkazia. The likelihood that Russia will respect the decision of the United Nations and others to give them the right of return is, unfortunately, very small.
Imperialists from the anticivilization in Moscow
2008/08/17
